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In the first half of the 21st century, Asia will 
most probably take centre stage in global 
politics. Although the United States and 
China are most likely to dominate in the new 
‘Great Game’ in Asia for the next decade, 
other important players, especially India, 
may exert a serious impact on the process of 
redefining the regional and pan-Asian 
Realpolitik. One of the most serious 
challenges that Asian big players and global 
policy-makers may face in the near-future is 
constructing an effective security mechanism 
in South Asia, the most multiethnic, 
multicultural and multireligious region in the 
world, with a population of 1.8 billion. The 
region’s stability and prosperity largely 
depend on external factors and bilateral 
relations with neighbours and geographically 
(but not strategically) distant partners. A 
region with rich ancient traditions, South 
Asia’s 20th century history is worth studying 
to understand how its politics may unfold in 
the future. South Asia will soon become one 
of the key arenas of global policies and global 
businesses and is likely to determine the 
future of our world to a large extent. Last but 
not least, it is also a place where a risky 
regional confrontation with China may take a 
very dangerous direction.                
 
The Indo-American-British alliance that 
never was  
 
Although history does not always offer the 
best explanations for future events, it may 
nonetheless help us understand the logic 
behind certain decisions and actions which in 
turn, could be replicated at another time. For 
example, a relatively obscure aspect of the 
Sino-Indian War of 1962 could have changed 
the balance of power in Asia half a century 
ago. This war only lasted for one month and 
ended when Beijing quite unexpectedly 
declared a ceasefire instead of moving its 
victorious troops further to the south, towards 
Calcutta. It was a rather surprising decision, 
and for many years hardly any academic 
analysis could provide a fully satisfying 
explication. China withdrew its own soldiers 
from the already-conquered territories and 
occupied only a relatively small area of Aksai 
Chin which is not an extremely important 
strategic geopolitical position. This did not 
seem to be an ideal example of the Realpolitik 
that Chinese communists were allegedly 
pursuing in Asia. The cause of Chinese 
withdrawal, however, was not their 
propagated desire for peace and stability in 
South Asia, as we came to know fifty years 
later. It was a fear that China’s military and 
political threat would push India to become a 
partner or regional ally of NATO countries 
including the United States and the United 
Kingdom. That alliance was in fact very close 
to materializing by the end of 1962 or in 1963.    
      
On October 20, 1962, China had attacked 
India on both flanks: in the east, Chinese 
troops invaded the Ladakh area which is a 
part of the state of Jammu & Kashmir; and in 
the west, they crossed the McMahon Line in 
the former NEFA (North Eastern Frontier 
Province, now Arunachal Pradesh). The 
Chinese easily defeated Indian troops in the 
border territories and were prepared to 
continue their blitzkrieg. It should be stressed 
here that Beijing has never recognized the 
McMahon Line as the international border 
between China and India and still claims 
Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh (former 
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NEFA) to be parts of Western and Southern 
Tibet respectively.1 
 
India was militarily battered and politically 
humiliated. According to Indian Defence 
Ministry statistics, 1,383 Indian soldiers were 
killed, almost 4,000 were taken prisoner and 
16,996 reported missing. These losses can be 
considered very small by the standards of 
modern warfare, yet the Chinese victorious 
blitzkrieg, as Ramachandra Guha concludes, 
must have been the most painful trauma in 
India’s imagination; the trauma which still 
haunts every Indian government.2 All in all, 
the defeat was a psychological and political 
drama rather than a geostrategic disaster. 
Ladakh (except Aksai Chin) and NEFA 
remained as a part of Indian territory as China 
abandoned its strategic plans to conquer the 
territories it had always claimed.  
 
Bruce Riedel in his publication “JFK’s 
Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the 
Sino-Indian War,” suggests that India’s 
implementation of the “Forward Policy” 
served as a major provocation to China in 
September 1962, and the main objective of 
Mao Zedong was to humiliate Nehru who 
was emerging as a leader of the Third World. 
Riedel refers to many documents which have 
been declassified in the United States quite 
recently but are likely still classified in India,3 
including the letters by the first Indian prime 
minister and India’s founding father, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, to President John F. 
Kennedy and British PM, Harold Macmillan, 
as well as JFK’s and Macmillan’s responses 
to Nehru.  
 
 
1 See: Tom A. Grunfeld, The Making of Modern 
Tibet, ME Sharpe, Armonk NY 1996, esp. pp.53-67 
on the Simla Convention (1914) signed by 
representatives of Tibet and Great Britain while the 
Chinese representative repudiated it.    
2 Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi. The History 
of the World’s Largest Democracy, Picador 2008, 
All these documents shed new light on the 
conflict and its possible implications. When 
India was losing its territory to China and 
suffering heavy casualties with every passing 
day, Nehru wrote to both Kennedy and 
Macmillan asking for military assistance. It is 
important to remember the political 
background of those times – India was 
following a policy of “Non-Alignment”, 
having declared its “strategic distance” 
toward NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This 
philosophy of global political equidistance 
was designed generally to win popularity 
among many post-colonial countries in Asia 
and Africa, which were in search for their 
own ideological identities and their 
positioning on the global stage. Nehru and his 
National Congress government succeeded to 
some extent in ensuring India’s favourable 
position throughout the postcolonial world, 
which became a source of anxiety for Beijing. 
But Nehru, having sought assistance from the 
leaders of the two most powerful NATO 
countries in 1962, undermined his (and 
India’s) strategy and might have redefined 
the logic of building long-term alliances.  
 
Ultimately the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) did not offer any real protection at the 
time of war, so in the world of Realpolitik, 
India was forced to identify the most reliable 
partners who would be able to stem the 
Chinese tide. In the letter of 19 November, 
Nehru very openly presented his requests, 
which looked more like demands, concluding 
with words that were not previously heard in 
communication with a NATO country:  
 
We are confident that your great country 
will in this hour of our trial help us in our 
p.336. Obviously Guha did not have access to Nehru’s 
letters both to Kennedy and Macmillan while writing 
his book.   
3 See: Bruce Riedel, JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the 
CIA, and the Sino-Indian War, The Brookings 
Institutions, Washington 2015  
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fight for survival of freedom and 
independence in this subcontinent as well 
as the rest of Asia. We on our part are 
determined to spare no effort until the 
threat posed by Chinese expansionist and 
aggressive militarism to freedom and 
independence is completely eliminated.4  
 
The message conveyed in the letter was clear: 
Nehru requested the U.S. president to join the 
war against China, just a decade after 
American forces had reached a ceasefire in 
the Korean War in which Beijing had actively 
participated. A similar letter was also 
delivered to the British prime minister.  
 
Both recipients of Nehru’s message 
responded positively. The United States and 
the United Kingdom were ready to assist 
India in its then and future struggle against 
Chinese aggression in South Asia. In the 
letter dated 10 December (after a ceasefire 
proposal was made by Beijing but met with 
scepticism in New Delhi), President Kennedy 
drafted a regional solution for India and 
Pakistan in the context of possible Chinese 
strategic plans:    
 
Prime Minister Macmillan and I reviewed 
the urgent problems caused by the Chinese 
threat to the subcontinent and what best we 
could do to strengthen India’s defenses. On 
the particular problem of air defense, we 
propose to send at an early date a joint 
UK-US team for full explorations with you 
and your people.  
 
4 Letter dated 19 November (pp. 2 and 3) with an 
attached message by S.K. Nehru (Ambassador of 
India to US), Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential 
Papers. National Security Files. India: Subjects: 
Nehru correspondence, 1962: JFKNSF-111-017. John 
F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum; 
Electronic versions of declassified documents 
available at https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-
viewer/archives/JFKNSF [accessed: 6th July 2020]    
5 Outgoing Telegram, 08721, December 22, 
Department of State; Papers of John F. Kennedy. 
We also discussed what the subcontinent 
can do to direct its energies more fully 
toward its defense. We were both greatly 
encouraged by the historic decision of 
India and Pakistan to take up in direct talks 
the great problems which separate you 
[…].5  
 
In another letter, the British prime minister 
echoed Kennedy’s offer of support.6   
 
The promise of future military assistance was 
paralleled by diplomatic activities. President 
Kennedy, who had already been in close 
contact with President Ayub Khan of 
Pakistan, likely played a decisive role in 
preventing a Pakistani attack on India. Both 
American and British leaders strongly 
encouraged Nehru to pursue diplomatic 
correspondence with Khan, and to start 
bilateral negotiations leading to more long-
lasting peaceful solutions (which, 
unfortunately, was unsuccessful in the long 
term). This top-level diplomacy was effective, 
as might be concluded from the course of 
events: Pakistan did not invade Kashmir 
while India was deeply absorbed in the 
conflict with China, and the Chinese invasion 
did not ultimately destabilize the region of 
South Asia. Beijing, having learned about the 
possibility of a US-UK-India alliance, did not 
wish to face this military and political 
Presidential Papers. National Security Files. India: 
Subjects: Nehru correspondence, 1962: JFKNSF-
111-017. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and 
Museum; [accessed: 7th July 2020]  
6 Incoming Telegram, Unnumbered, December 24, 
Department of State; Papers of John F. Kennedy. 
Presidential Papers. National Security Files. India: 
Subjects: Nehru correspondence, 1962: JFKNSF-
111-017. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and 
Museum; [accessed: 8th July 2020]  
NATO Association of Canada 
 
 45 
challenge that could bring about disastrous 
implications for its future strategic plans.7  
 
Political complexity in 21st century South 
Asia 
 
This historical precedent of the “Indo-
American-British Triangle” should be kept in 
mind when analysing the geostrategic 
situation in South Asia and the potential 
developments of regional scenarios. 
Advanced technologies and increased 
mobility of people have reshaped the social 
and economic landscapes, but unlike in 
Central and Eastern Europe, the politico-
ideological map of this part of Asia and its 
geopolitical conditions have not changed 
significantly since the 1970s. India, led by 
Narendra Modi’s BJP government, may be 
more interested, as Parag Khanna suggests, in 
developing political meritocracy in a 
Singaporean fashion than preserving classical 
liberal democracy, but that does not eliminate 
the external challenges faced by the country.8 
India is more strategically focused on China 
than on Pakistan, and is building its 
conventional military capabilities 
accordingly. Pakistan is still strategically 
focused on India and perceives Indian 
conventional build-up as seriously 
threatening, so it is keen on developing its 
nuclear capabilities accordingly. All the 
players have quite complex relationships 
with each other. India is for China not only a 
 
7 It is not entirely clear how the Chinese learned about 
this possible Indo-American-British Alliance. The 
only semi-official channel of regular communication 
between U.S. and China (they did not maintain official 
diplomatic relations at that time) was in Warsaw. 
These were Sino-American ambassadorial talks held 
on a regular basis from the late 1950s to 1970. Not 
much, however, is available in Polish archives while 
Chinese archives are closed to Western researchers.      
8 See Parag Khanna, The Future is Asian, Simon & 
Schuster, New York 2019, especially the chapter 
Singapore: A Technocratic Role Model, pp. 286 – 301  
See also: Chatterji, Angana; Blom, Hansen, Thomas 
Blom; Jaffrelot, Christophe (ed.), Majoritarian State. 
political and military competitor, but an 
economic partner as well, while Pakistan has 
been a political and military ally and recipient 
of Beijing’s politically motivated economic 
aid and investments.9  
 
As Ahmed Rashid points out, many 
Pakistanis believe that if their relationship 
with the United States were to break down, 
lost economic aid could be replaced by 
China. Indeed, China is geographically close 
to Pakistan and has helped substantially with 
Islamabad’s nuclear weapons and nuclear 
energy programs; and it has provided the 
military with several billion dollars’ worth of 
heavy weapons at cut-rate prices. Not 
surprisingly, Pakistan calls China its “all-
weather friend.” 10  China, according to 
Khanna, “whether under the slogan of 
‘peaceful rise’ offered in the 2000s by 
President Hu Jintao or the more current 
‘harmonious world’ used by Xi Jinping, is 
seeking to combine Ming Dynasty 
expansionism with Tang Dynasty 
cosmopolitanism.”11  
 
In other words, China plans to create a world 
order in which its glorified principles and 
interests sit at the core, and Western 
dominance and hierarchy would gradually be 
replaced by some sort of parity among 
civilizations. However, Beijing will serve as 
the primus inter pares, at least in the first 
phase of this promoted Pan-Asian 
How Hindu Nationalism is Changing India, London 
2018.    
9 Robert D. Lamb, Sadika Hameed, Kathryn Mixon, 
South Asia Regional Dynamics and Strategic 
Concerns. A Framework for U.S. Policy and Strategy 
in South Asia, 2014 – 2026, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/140116_Lamb_South
AsiaRegionalDynamics_WEB.pdf [accessed: 7th July 
2020] 
10 Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink, Allen Lane, 
Noida 202, p. 195. 
11 Parag Khanna, The Future is Asian., p. 137. 
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transformation. Sooner or later, India will 
recognize it as a serious threat to its own 
interests in South Asia and the Indian 
Ocean.12 For other regional players as well as 
for international policy-makers, India is 
perceived as a fundamental pillar of the Pan-
Asian balance of power, whose serious 
weakening would ultimately lead to pan-
continental destabilization and pave the way 
for further Chinese expansion. This sentiment 
is echoed in the statement made in July 2020 
by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, that 
“the US is reviewing its global deployment of 
forces to ensure it is postured appropriately to 
counter the People’s Liberation Army, given 
the increasing threat posed by China to Asian 
countries like India, Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
the Philippines”. 13  However, it should be 
noted here that Asia’s political complexity is 
ill-suited to a “Unipolar Moment” strategy, 
and a much more multinational and 
collaborative approach is needed. 
 
Conclusion: Historical precedents offer 
lessons for the future    
 
There is no efficient mechanism for 
international security in South Asia. India, as 
the largest democracy in the world, should be 
interested in maintaining regional and pan-
continental stability with reliable partners. 
The challenges of political/military 
expansionism, energy security or nuclear 
proliferation should compel New Delhi to 
look for additional frameworks which allow 
it to work closely with other regional powers.  
 
12 See esp. Abdurrahman Utku Hacioğlu, The case for 
NATO’s global partnership with India, NDC [NATO 
Defense College] Policy Brief, No. 03 – February 
2020,  
http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1419 
[accessed: 9th July 2020]  
13  Lalit K. Jha, US reducing its troops in Europe to 
counter Chinese threat to India & others, Pompeo 
says, Diplomacy, “The Print”, 26 June, 2020, 
https://theprint.in/diplomacy/us-reducing-its-troops-
NATO provides an instructive framework, 
one with more than six decades of experience 
in multinational military planning and 
cooperation. 14  Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi may have critical views about 
Jawaharlal Nehru and his policies, but he 
should be reminded that history sometimes 
provides us with potential partners. When 
Nehru’s India was in real danger in 1962, two 
NATO members were prepared to offer 
military and political assistance, and their 
preparedness probably stopped further 
Chinese aggression, as well as preventing an 
Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir. 
History tends to repeat itself, and the 
diplomatic version of the proverb “a friend in 
need, is a friend indeed” may be the most 
succinct description for how India and NATO 













[accessed: 5 July 2020]  
14 I deal in a detailed way with the problem of India – 
NATO relations in my publication The Issues of 
Political Security in South Asia and Its Implications 
for the EU and NATO, “The Polish Quarterly of 
International Affairs”, vol.25, no. 3/2016, pp. 22-44.    
